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This paper d epicts a pic ture of Am erican co mpen sation system s and pra ctices in light of con cerns for eq uitable
treatment of workers.  It raises questions abou t these practices in reference to ra cial, gender,  and exe cutive pa y levels
in the U.S., and points out that the principle of equity applied regularly has fallen short when interests and needs o f
particular groups have been examined. Addressing this shortfa ll in relation to equity concerns is the key policy
challenge facing  the American  compen sation mana ger.
INTRODUCTION
“The American way” of compensation managem ent has evolv ed along ro utes particular  to the way in which the
U.S. eco nomy dev eloped o ver the past ce ntury.  Indeed , as will be seen in  what follows, the ways in which people are
paid reflect a host of historical, economic, legal, political, social, and technological forces which have interacted on the
American scene.  Thus there are major events/movements which have formed and altered the way in which organizations
have chosen to reward their employees and structured the process by which pay is delivered.
Pay in America may be described as based on considerations of external and internal equity—although in different
measures at different times.  It is doubtful that any employer who reported on his/her pay system would claim anything
other than that the issues of “equity” were what drove the system.  Of course, wha t goes into  that equity and  how it is
determined are crucial to the operation of any system.
THE CURRENT SCENE
Several patterns characterize the current compensation situation in the United States.  First is the relatively slow
growth during the 19 90s of the lev els of pay of the typical worker.  The US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides
data on the  average ho urly earnings of production workers and the consumer price index (for urban workers, 1982-84
= 100).  From 1990 through the end of 1999, the  earnings measure rose  3.2 percent per year wh ile consumer prices rose
2.7 percent per year.  This process yielded a modest 3.8 percent increase in real earnings over the nine years or 0.4
percent annually.  Non-farm productivity (again, from the BLS) went up by more than 20 percent over the nine years,
leaving a distinct sense that productivity gains have not been shared with the American worker to any substantial degree.
At the same time , concern h as grown in  the business and popular press over the compensation packages awarded
to America’s corporate leaders.  The American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
refers to “Runaway CEO Pay” on its Executive Paywatch web site.  Citing Business Week, the labor federation notes that
average CEO p ay at major c orporatio ns rose from  42 times av erage pro duction wo rker pay in 1 980, to  85 times in 1990
and to a multiple o f 419 times b y 1998!  M uch of this, of course, is not salary but reflects various performance
achievements,  especially stock options which have done very well in the bull market of the 1990s.  Nevertheless, a few
years ago cynics took note of the $99 million pay packa ges granted  to the two co-CEOs of Time-Warner and wondered
what the figures would have been had the company actually made a profit over that year.
Finally, different educ ational attainments, geographic concentrations, and family responsibilities (among many
factors) and differential access to opportunities have generated strong race and gender patterns in the earnings
picture— despite  equity considerations on the part of individual employers.  While (as we will see below) the rather
technical systems for setting pay in America mean that “usually” two people standing side-by-side doing the same job
for the same employer with similar lengths of service are paid the sam e, the other influe nces noted  above sha pe overa ll
earnings patterns.  Thus, the National Committee for Pay Equity (using US Department of Commerce data) cites the
following pay gap for 1997:
                   Median Annual Earnings by Race and Sex
Race/Gender Earnings Earnin gs Ratio
White Males  $35,193           100.0%
White Women  $25,331         71.9%
Black Men  $26,432         75.1%
Black Women  $22,035                                     62.6%
Hispanic Men  $21,615         61.4%
Hispanic Women  $18,973         53.9%
While most of these earnings gaps have narrowed over the past two and a half decades – some quite substantially as
in the case of white women who se average earnings rose from  58.7 percent to 73 .7 percent of white male earnings –
the relative earnings of Hispanic males have actually fallen, perhaps reflecting large scale immigration.
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES
Pay in America may be described as based on considerations of external and internal equity – although in different
measures at different times.  It is doubtful that any employer who reported on his/her pay system would claim anything
other than that the issues of “equity” were what drove the system.  Of course, what goes into  that equity and  how it is
determined are crucial to the operation of any system.  The c oncepts o f external and  internal equity an d their
determination rest upon two distinct classifications of jobs and their treatme nt.  The first group is the key or benchmark
jobs; the second is the non-key or non-benchmark jobs—a distinction simple in title but important in operation.
Key (or benchmark) jobs are those which link the organiza tion to the labor market in that typically they are jobs
into which new hires come and, as a result, provide measures of market pay.  Thro ugh the use o f wage and sa lary surveys
of key jobs the organization is able to position itself relative to others in the market (i.e., establish external equity) and
specify its competitiveness.
Non-key or non-benchmark jobs are those which are particular to the organization in that they are jobs into which
individuals  have been  promo ted and/o r transferred a s they have gain ed knowle dge and e xperience  which is specific to
the firm.  These jobs no longer meet the test of the market in that typ ically outsiders a re not hired in to them with a market
pay rate identifiable.  It is these jobs for which job evaluation is the tool of pay determination, a subject to which we now
turn.
Internal Equity:
The Rise and Use of Job Evaluation Systems1
The focus on internal equity has led employers, consultants, and even unions in America to rely on job evaluation
as a major part of the wage and salary determining processes.  The definitions of job evaluation are straightforward.
From the United States Employment Service we have:
...the process of determining the relative values of jobs in an organization so as to establish a wage
classification system  for that organ ization. 
This  obviously reflects the governmental approach to pay where governmental agencies typically use a job classification
system; see below, pp. 9-11.
Another definition, from the private secto r, reads:
a formal process for determining the relative worth of various work assignments (Henderson, 1989).
While  similar definitions could be listed extensively, the real issue in the above is the idea of “relative” worth of
jobs within an orga nization.  W ith rare exception, job evaluation systems have at their core the concept of equity attained
through assessing the rela tive worth of jo bs individua lly, vis-a-vis the other job s within the orga nization.  The primary
differentiating factor among such systems are the varied   processes used in these assessm ents.
Job evaluation had its beginnings, at least concep tually, in the 1800s when there were pleas at the federal level of
government that jobs be paid based on their worth.  By 1902 the United States Civil Service Commission was
recommend ing that jobs be paid ba sed upon duties perfo rmed in those jobs.
In the private sector, the first developments in job evaluation came through the work of Frederick W. Taylor at
the Midvale Steel Company.  His efforts to break jobs down into elements which could be used for “time-base rates” was
the forerunn er of today’s jo b evaluation  systems.   
The early 1900 s saw the first footstep s of job eva luation as it is know n today.  The Co mmonw ealth Edison
Company of Chicago is credited with introducing the first job classification plans circa 1909 as assessing the structure
of jobs crept into human resources practices. This was largely the result of the introduction of job analysis—the p rocess
of dissecting jobs into the ir constituent parts as well as specifying the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) associated
with those co mpone nts—with its p rimary outp uts: the job d escription an d job sp ecification.  
In 1925, M errill R. Lott form alized these d evelopm ents in Wage Scales and Job Evaluation, which introduced the
first of what we call today point factor systems of job evaluation.  This work was followed on by efforts of the American
Management  Association and Relations Counselors.  The National Metal Trades Association (NMTA) and the  National
Electrical Manufacturers’ Association (NEMA) pushed for job evaluation systems as did the spread of “industrial
unionism” in the 1930 s.  The Congress of Industrial O rganizations  unions, which  organized  the skilled and  unskilled in
the factory, nee ded a wa y to manage the differences in wages of these two disparate groups...something for which job
evaluation provided  the answers.
While  job evaluation was on the increase in the early decades of the twentieth century, the trajectory was not steep.
Most  organizati ons still paid workers on a “personal” basis rather than on anything approaching a “scientific” or
“rational”  basis.  This led to women being paid less because they “only were going to get married and leave,” married
men being paid more than single ones as “they had families to support,” and similar ascription-based practices.  There
was, as yet, no major outcry for rationalization of pay systems and structures based on the job rather than its occupan t.
That call for the use of job evaluation as a determinant of internal pay equity occurred as a result of World War
II.  The desire/need of the National War Labor Board to control wa ges was par amount to  maintain eco nomic stab ility;
this necessitated  a consistent,  rational way to set pay rates.  At least four drivers were pressing for so me precise  form of
job worth assessm ent.  First, the haphazard pay setting in most organizations led to a disarray of rates which would have
been formidable to control.  Second, the creation of thousands of “new” jobs for the war effort meant that there needed
to be some way to determine what they were worth so they could be p aid appropriately relative to existing job s.  Third,
the shift from jobs which utilized high skilled workers to those which required lower skill levels, as the better workers
went off to war, necessitated some way to translate the co mpone nts of the old jo bs to the new  ones at the ap propriate
price.  Fou rth, the biddin g of different firms fo r scarce lab or led to co mpetitive wa ge increases  which were n ot tied to
jobs or their worth.  These pressures led from the simple to the complicated in job evaluation forms (Zollitsch and
Langsner, 1970).
All forms of job evaluation base their measurement of the internal worth or “content” of jobs on what are termed
“compe nsable  factors.”  As will be evident in what follows, the idea of a compensable factor is treated in a variety of
ways in different job evaluation programs—again from the simple to the complicated—as the  designers of these systems
have worked to  obtain bette r measures o f the worth of jo bs to organ izations.  It is worth  noting at this po int that virtually
all regulatory legislation defines compensable factors as “skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions.”  The
reader may reflect on this in the discussion which follow s.
Ranking systems
     Ranking, perhaps the simplest of systems conceptually, is a technique that uses the job as a totality to rank them
from the top to the b ottom of a h ierarchy.   Here the compensable factor is the job itself in that those who rate or rank the
jobs are supposed to look at the jobs in their totality and generally compare them as complete units rather than dissecting
them into any of their component parts.  Of course, it is possible that some subjective comparison of internal job content
(e.g., mental requirements, working conditions) may affect these determinations but the idea is to look at the job in total
in order to ra nk it, making eq uity an ordere d outcom e only.
In practice, the entire organization may not be used and subsets of jobs—perhaps by department, location, or
business unit—are often ranked as a group and then (perhaps) integrated with the other job s in the broad er universe (e .g.,
several departments combined into a division).  It is the sheer volume o f jobs which c an burde n and per haps ove rwhelm
the ranking system; because of this techniques including paired comparisons, alternative ranking, and group
categorization have bee n developed to  assist with the ranking process.
At the end of any of any of the ranking processes, the orga nization will have a list of jobs (or job groups) ranked
from top to  bottom (o r the reverse) .  One maj or prob lem with this system, in  the view of many, is that there is no way
to quantify the relative differences among the jobs.  The system is ordinal, it only gives you...as its name implies...the
rank order of jobs and tells you nothing about the measured or relative differences among them.  The limitation imposed
by the ranking system becomes apparent when you try to link  your internal d ata to the mar ket.  How d o you equ ate
market rates to internal rates?  
One way to do this is to compare the organization’s rates for key or benchmark jobs to the rates being paid in the
labor market.  Then adju st the organization’s rates appropriately and move the rates for non-key jobs in what is deemed
to be an ap propriate  manner.  
This  means that the two major issues with ranking systems are, first, explaining them and then, defending what has
been done.  While the systems are very simple on their faces, they do not provide any way for you to justify actions taken.
This makes ranking systems’ wage differen ce determ inations very d ifficult to explain  to workers and these differences
problem atic to defend  in a legal action.  
We note that even today, despite their difficulties, ranking systems are estimated to account for about 20 percent
of all job evaluation methodologies used in the united states (Henderson, 1989).
Grade Description/Job Classification Systems
Grade description systems, often used by governmental bodies and other employers w ith wide varieties  of disparate
jobs, move a step  up from ran king progr ams and b egin to look  at the equities am ong job s and their  composition through
identified compen sable factors—although not as thoroughly as do the quantitative systems to be discussed below.  They
are based  on the job  description  and job  specification; b ut in a rather bro ad way.
Organizations which might ha ve jobs em ploying eco nomists, carp enters, phys icists, chauffeurs, botanists, dish-
washers, sociologists, an d others co uld have d ifficulty attempting to c ompare  broadly  across them while trying to treat
them equitably.  The first task, then, of the designer of a grade description system for such a situation is to determine how
many “grades” o r “classes” to  utilize to capture the range of job tasks within the organization while allowing them to be
grouped in relatively “homogeneous” groups.  Large numbers of such classes mean the relative differences between jobs
may be easier to  identify while making the task of such identification more difficult; small numbers of grades make larger
numbers of jobs loo k more alike  while making  identification of different job tasks less important in segregating job s.
Usually, there are from 12 to 15 classes although some employers may utilize 20 or more.
Once the appropriate number of grades is determined, then employers group co mmon ele ments, or co mpensab le
factors, of these jobs into what might be called “generic” job descriptions and job specifications—a simplified illustration
would  include all jobs which require a bachelor’s degree, three years of active experience, and one year of service as a
supervisor—and designate them a common grade or classification (e.g., G rade 11 ) regardless o f the field of activity
involved.  
Next,  what is done is to place each of the individual jobs (with its particular job description  and spec ification) into
the grade or class with the closest fitting general description and specification.  The idea, of course, is that there will be
a set of all-encompassing general class/grade descriptions and that any specific jo b will fit in somewh ere within the set.
The next task involves taking those classes which are entry classes or grades, which are to be compared with the
market,  separating them (at least conceptually) from the others.  Typically, you are talking about four to seven benchmark
classes but, as is often true in such situations, the number is dependent upon what jobs are included and policies and
practices of the employer.2  It is these classes or grades which are the key ones and the ones for which wage and salary
surveys are conducted.
On its face, this type of whole job system has advantage s over the ranking systems.  It usually uses more than one
or two compensable factors and a broader range of job content is measurable.  Difficulties include writing specific job
descriptions to meet general grade descriptions rather than to accurately reflect what the job actually is.  The broad grade
descriptions usually include p articular catch  phrases like “su pervises,”  “is res ponsible fo r,” “reports to,” “operates
independ ently,” and “has disc retion” which  are then includ ed by the astu te personn el practit ioner in the specific jobs
under consideration.   This may automatically get the job slotted into a certain class because of language rather than
actual job c ontent. 
     While better than the rank ing system, grad e descriptio n systems also fall sh ort on cou rtroom d efensibility.
These plans do not offer as much detailed, work-related rationale to justify equitable pay differentials as many would
like.  But note tha t grade des cription sys tems have been used extensively in civil service employment—the federal
government and many sta te and loca l governme nts have utilized  this form of pa y system.  This is no t meant to imp ly that
the private sec tor doesn ’t use this type of system , just that most exp osure to it co mes from c ivil service.3
These  systems, ranking and grade description, are at one en d of the distrib ution of job  evaluation p rograms.  W e
now move to those which are more quantitative and subject to more intensive measurement: factor comparison and point
factor systems.
Factor Comparison Systems
The factor comparison system combines some elements  of the ranking system with a set of defined payment
schedules for what are termed compensable factors, those components which the employer recognize s are impo rtant to
the set of job s. 
The typical compensable factors used are few:
Mental R equireme nts
Skill Requir ements
Physical Re quiremen ts
Respon sibility
Working Conditions
The next step is to  identify those jobs in the structure which are regarded as key jobs.  The actual number of jobs
to use depend s on the size o f the organiza tion and the ra nge of job s to be cap tured.  For our purposes four will be used.
The process then involves identifying the rank or relative importance of the key jobs with respect to the
compe nsable  factors—a process which may be repeated more than once fo r a validity chec k.  See Ta ble I which ar rays
the four key jobs across the above compensable factors in a mythical manufacturing environment, ranking then
individually  for each job.  Ideally, these compensable factors are independent so  that the ranking d iffers by factor, a re sult
evident in the example of Table I as each order of ranking is different.4  
Next one allocates existing pay rates across these facto rs, a matter of taking the wage rates/salaries of the key jobs
and allocating them across each of the comp ensable facto rs for each o f the jobs und er conside ration.  (See a gain Tab le
I)  Note that there is a certain amount of reasoned judgement here because the analyst is determining “How much money
is given/assigned for ranking one, two, three and four on each of the compensable factors?”
Thus, in our example, being first in Skill Requirements rates $7.02 for the Tool and Die Maker but only $3.89 for
the Sweeper when it comes to W orking Co nditions.  Simila rly, being fourth in  Mental R equireme nts is worth only $2.88
compa red to $2 .92 for the sa me ranking  in Wor king Cond itions.  


Note  further that something very important is being revealed by these numbers – which is true of all systems but
very clear here.  The organization using this system has decided what is of value to it—what it wants to pay for—when
it selects its set of com pensable  factors and it has decided what those factors are worth in the set of jobs which
characterize the organization.  T hese are important as nece ssary characteristics of compensab le factors.
Once the key jobs have been arrayed by compensable fac tor, along with the associated respective p ay componen ts,
the specific pay components are set forth as is done in Table II.  Here, the dollars per factor are aligned in such a way
that it is now possible to slot the non-key jobs into the system where they fit among the established key jobs.  Tha t is,
each job  is compar ed on a d ollars and ce nts basis with  every other job, based  on each of the comp ensable factors, and
slotted into its relative position.  The total pay rate of the job is the sum of what it would get for each of the  compen sable
factors.5
 
Point Factor Systems
Point factor systems (also called point systems) have a history dating from the early 1900’s and have been
developed in a variety of ways.  In  fact, point factor systems are the most commonly used type of job evaluation system
in the United States (Henderson, 1989).  They base equity upon the idea of attaching numbers to identified co mpone nts
of the job.
The basic idea of a point system is to divide the job into a (fairly) large number  of compensable factors which
represent the structural components of a point factor system; included are “factors” and  (perhaps) “subfactors”  and may
possibly  include “weights.”  The use of weights, as is described below, is a technique which allows you to make further
adjustmen ts of your results sho uld you cho ose to do  so.6
The fundamental principle here is that the organizatio n has to cho ose/select a se t of compe nsable  factors that reflect
what the organization wants to pay for due to internal considerations based on the content and mix of jobs.  The choice
of compensable factors usually is made based on the following sorts of criteria, expanding upon what has been noted
previously:
A. To be equitable, they should be work related, demonstrably derived from the actual content of jobs performed
and the differences therein.  They need to be supported by the job descriptions and job specifications of the organization.
B. The factors should be acceptable to the participants. This means that even if only a small proportion of the work
force is affected by a particular component, it may be necessary to include a factor for credibility.7  
C. Comp ensable  factors should  be business related in that the organization is paying for what it values.  It is argued
that the factors should be consistent with the organization’s culture, business direction, and the nature of the work
processe s.  
D. Factors must differentiate among jobs b y being independen t so that the specific characteristics inherent in each
job can be identified.  What we are saying here is that, ideally, factors should not overlap because if they do, that
redundancy contributes disproportionately in total job points and the true value of the job is misstated and pay will not
be equitab ly set.
The next step is to choose the subfactors associated with each of these factors.  What this involves is identifying
particular categories which are subsets of the factors have been selected earlier.8  As an example, Table III reports on
some typical factors and subfac tors used in such systems.
What is evidenced  in Table III is a set of four compensable factors with a total of twelve subfactors.  It would be
possible  to have twenty compensable factors and eliminate the factor/subfactor distinction altogether.  Whiche ver route
is taken, the logic of the system is the same.  Most organizations typically use only eight to twelve of these possible
subfactors as a matter of convenience and because in individual organizations there would be duplication between
categories if many were used...which is the same as saying the facto rs would no t be indepe ndent.  It is the de sire to
minimize overlap which leads to a particular subset of the factors being employed.
Once the eight to twenty factors /subfactors a re identified, the  organizatio n then decid es how to ar ray them (in
relative terms) and h ow much  the individua l measures w ill be worth.  T his is importa nt as the process involves the
enterprise sa ying what it values in th e mix of job s it operates an d what it will pay for  this—at lea st relatively.
As an illustrative example, consider the case of education:

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 5 POINTS
JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL  9 POINTS
HIGH SCHOOL 15 POINTS
TWO YEARS COLLEGE 25 POINTS
COLLEGE DEGREE 40 POINTS
MASTERS DEGREE 55 POINTS
DOCTORATE 65 POINTS
In establishing these seven degrees, the organization is specifying those characteristics which distinguish  among
the jobs it staffs (i.e., they reflect what variations in education have worth to the organization).  Once the
degrees/categories are determined, the organization next attaches specific point values to them (as is also done to the
other choices in T able III).  What this is sa ying is that, regardless of the job, it will be given the appropriate respective
points indicated on this chart `as a function of its (i.e., the job’s) educational requirement9.
Each job in the organization is then rated based on the set of compensable factors and the appropriate level or
categorical values of those  factors.  W hen this proc ess is comp leted, a set of p oints for every job is totaled, reflecting
the relative worth of each to the organization internally.  Here once more internal equity is measured as the relationship
of each job to the others in the organization.
We have talked about establishing the number of points associated with each of our subfactors and the factors to
which they sum based on totalling points.  It is possible to attach or assign a weight to each of the compensable factors
and typically this is done in one of two ways: The first is simply to allocate 100 percent among the factors on an ad hoc
basis.  One might decide, for example, to allocate:
SKILL EFFORT RESPONSIBILITY WORKING CONDITIONS
 30% 20% 35% 15%
What this is saying is that this organization is going to adjust or standardize the factors by the above noted
weights.10
Another way to deal with the weighting is to derive empirical m arket weights.  This typically involves use of the
key jobs for your weighting.  What the organization does is establish pay rates (market rates) for the key jobs.  It then
runs a regression using the poin ts for each facto r for each o f the key jobs a gainst the mark et rates to get co efficients
which will constitute the weights which are applied to all jobs in the organization regardless of whether they are key or
non-key jobs.  Thus, the organization might get a regression like:
WAGE= 9112.00 + .4205 (SKILL) + .3201 (EFFORT) + 
.6866 (RESPONSIBILITY) + .2113 (WORKING CONDITIONS) + Error
These  values can be used as they are or they can be standardiz ed to yield  a particular total (e.g., 1.00).  With these
weights established, they are multiplied times the points assigned to each factor/subfactor for each job to produce a new
point value for the job which reflects the weighting scheme.
The idea of differing weights should alert the reader that point  factor job evaluation schemes can have varied
weighting patterns.  In practice, there is a plethora of point factor systems with many such plans differing from one
employer to another.11  The one obvious question is why are there so many job evaluation plans and are there any
differences among them?  One interesting perspective on these systems can b e obtained  from Ta ble IV, whic h reports
on the weights attached to the major co mpensab le factors— Skill, Effort,  Responsibility, and Working Conditions—by
fifteen different job evaluation systems.
The wide array of weighting possibilities is apparent from Table IV, reflecting choices made by individual
developers of such plans.  These choices are the result of policy decisions which are driven by what each organization
believes it needs to pa y for in its business en vironmen t.  It should be  clear that non e is better than a ny other; it is simply
a matter of deciding what the org anization wishes to recognize, with pay, within the structure of job s it utilizes.

One advantage of the point system is that it allows you to develop a picture of what is happening.  That is, through
use of specialized  compute r program s for comp ensation system s or spread sheets with more generalized cha racteristics,
it is possible to fully illustrate how a compensation system is operating.  This comes about through estimation of the
internal or organization pay line, the market pay line, and adjustments to the former in light of the latter.12
With  data on points  and wage s/salaries, the enter prise is in a po sition to estimate  the organiza tion pay line with
regression.  The general formulation of the line involves regressing the organization’s pay level for each job against the
associated  job poin ts.  
This  is illustrated in Figure I which reports the organization’s jobs, identified as “O’s”, indicating the respective
points  and pay rate for each.  These values form the b asis of the regression line which also is called the line of least
squares, the organizational pay line, the internal pay line, the trend line, the pay tr end line, pay policy line, and other
similar names in American compensation literature.13
Of note is the fact that it is the o rganizationa l pay line which re flects one me asure of the eq uity of the pay system.
The line is upward slo ping with mo re pay being  associated  with more p oints; jobs o f more wor th to the organ ization
receive higher pay ra tes.  Obviously, the slope of the pay line is a m easure of “ho w” much m ore such jo bs are wor th with
steeper lines indicating more value attributed to e ach job e valuation po int by the organ ization than is true  for less steeply
sloped lines.  Thus, the “e quity” attache d to differently slope d lines, while  certainly measurable and observable, may vary
in the eyes of an observer as both policy issue and fairness measure.
Something in Between - The Hay System
One job evaluation approach is perhaps the best known and the most widely used single system in America: the
Hay Guide Chart - Profile Method of Job Evaluation.14  Originally developed by Edward  Hay and h is associates between
1939 and 1950, and refined through the years as the nature of jobs and work and their content have changed, the system
combines elements of the factor comparison and point factor systems and is susceptible to the quantitative manipulations
of statistical analysis.15  As such, it merges the whole job approach to job evaluation with the mathematical processes
of the point factor methods.
The Hay System uses three compensable factors, each with a set of sub-factors or dimensions:16
Know-How
The sum total of every kind of skill, however acquired, needed for acceptable job performance.
Dimensions
Practical procedures, specialized techniques, and scientific disciplines
Managerial know-how in integrating and harmonizing diversified managerial functions
Human relations skills used in managing the people component of the job
Problem Solving
The amount of original, “self-starting” thinking required by the job for analyzing, evaluating, creating,
reasoning, and reaching co nclusions.
Dimensions
The thinking environment in which problems are solved
The thinking challenge presented by the problems to be solved
Accoun tability
The measure o f the effect of the job on the organizations’s end re sults.
Dimensions
The freedom of the job incumbent to act in terms of personal or procedural control inherent in the job
The impact of the job on the end results of the organization which may ra nge from d irect contro l to
indirect support




The magnitude, or dollar size, of the areas of the organization affected by the job
Hay analysts, organizatio n represen tatives, and ind ividual emp loyees work  cooper atively to analyze and  evaluate
jobs using criteria from Hay Guide Charts, illustrated in Figures II, III and IV, which provide guidance as to how these
compe nsable  factors and their respective dimensions are to be applied to each,  Once applied, the charts provide points
which are then totale d to give a q uantitative mea sure of relative w orth as is done with the point factor systems described
above.  The global measures provided by the Charts lead to what is termed a Job Profile17 which associates the relative
worth of a job to th e mix of po ints it receives from  each of the thre e factors; Kn ow-How , Proble m Solv ing and
Accoun tability.
As part of the ongo ing develo pment of the ir methodo logy, the Hay G roup has a dded the  concep t of Additional
Compensation Elements (or ACEs18) to the basic system.  These elements19 are drawn from the “ph ysical, tempo ral,
or contextual conditions’ under which the job is performed and reflect the growing concern with issues like stress and
burnout which have b ecome e ver more  prevalent in the  workplac e.  The use of ACEs generates point values which are
combined with those from Know-H ow, Problem S olving and Accou ntability to produce point totals for individual jo bs.
Contemporary Job Evaluation Systems
In the post World War II  period, a number of new approaches to job evaluation have been developed.  These have
changed the focus of the process from job content/requirements and employee capability to measures actually assessing
what is done by the job incumbent.  The idea is that measurement of (and reward to) th e required performance
compo nents of the job represents a better method of specifying what the organization values.  By so doing, these systems
drop down a level and actually look at activity levels rater than broad definitions of functions and/or areas of
responsibility.20  
The first attempt at such  an appro ach was in the A ir Force which developed a program called “CODAP” which
stands for Comp uterized O ccupation al Data An alysis Plan.  It was an attempt to describe jobs by asking people what they
did on the job .  Sibson and company took the computer software from CODAP and developed a job evaluation system
called ‘the automated job evaluation system.’  Mercer, Meidinger, and Hanson have a software system of a similar nature
called JEBO R or Job E valuation By Occu pational Requireme nts.
Another such generation job evaluation system is known as the Decision Band Method.  Developed by Thomas
Paterson, it was purchased by Arthur Young to be sold commercially as the consulting firm moved into the human
resources area (see Paterson and Husband, 1970, Paterson, 1972a, and Paterson 1972b).  Since that time, the system has
been sold to others and  is applied in a variety of settings.
The basic  idea of the Decision Band approach is that it is equitable to reward a job based on the breadth of the
occupa nt’s decisions, a concept not unlike the idea of Span of C ontrol advocated  by Elliot Jaques (197 0, 1979).  T hese
decisions can range from the extremely complex (e.g., upon what strategic course to set the corporation) to the very
simple (e.g., when to attach a nut to a bolt).  In the Decision Band Method, this range of decision possibilities is arrayed
from Band F (at the top) to Band A:
BAND F - POLICY MAKING DECISIONS
These are dec isions determining the direction and o verall objectives of the enterprise
BAND E - PROGRAMMING DECISIONS
These a re the decisio ns determin ing the mean s to attain the org anization’s go als
BAND D - INTERPRETIVE DECISIONS
These  decisions involve specifying how the organizational goals will be carried out at lower levels of the
enterprise an d involve re source de ployment 
BAND C - PROCESS DECISIONS
Here the decisions involve converting the organization’s objectives to practice using available technology and
resources
BAND B -
OPERATIONAL DECISIONS
These decisions foc us on how the opera ting specifications will be carried out on a day-to-da y basis.
BAN D A - 
DEFINED DECISIONS
These are the decisions over which there is little choice; how the elements of the job are to be performed but
not which elements constitute the job 
The Decision Bands are translated into numerical scores and the system is treated like the point factor methods described
earlier.  Again, regression is used and market and organizational pay lines calculated (see below).  From these re sults,
individual p ay is set.
To provide perspective, however, the array of “contemporar y” job eva luation systems ind icated abo ve, while
yielding new and d ifferent insights into the p rocess of ev aluating job s, has not “struck  gold” in term s of changing the
basic nature of the outcomes of the process.  Since the basic objective of all such systems is to provide measures of the
relative worth of jobs, the mix and structure of jobs within an organization provides an unescapable foundation which
generates and limits the ultimate differences among system outputs, a subject to which we now turn.
Does the Job Evaluation System Make a Difference?
The answer to the question of whether type of job evaluation  system used makes a  difference in outcomes is in one
sense an unqualified “Yes!” in terms of measured internal equity.  This is evident in Table V which  reports the results,
sores, or points; in absolute and relative terms, for four different actual job evaluation systems.21  
What Table  V does is compare the “relative” worth of each of twenty jobs in an organiza tion relative to the base
job: Packer.
It is evident from Table V that these systems generate wide variations in the measured relative worth of this set
of 21 jobs studied; and the variations are of two types.  First, the magnitude of the relatives differs widely—from, for
example, over 500 times (for the Hay and Decision Band systems) to just over three times (for the basic point factor
system) for the relationship between the internal relative worth of the base job of packer an d the com pany presid ent.
Second, the systems eve n differ in the mix  of relative jobs in certain case: thus the punch press helper job is worth less
than the accounting clerk job in the H ay system, worth more in all others.
However, before we can answer questions about how much these differences contribute to actual pay differences,
we need to look at the issues of extern al equity.  We now turn to these q uestions.
External Equity: The Wage and Salary Survey
Traditio nally, American pay setting practices have rested/stood on the principle of external equity through the use
of wage and salary surveys to obtain the “market” wage.  After all, if it is determined by the market it must b e
“equitable.”   There ha s been significa nt reliance on  the market with  a belief that, just as the  econom ist can identify a
“market clearing wage” through the intersection of the supply and demand curves, the compensation practitioner can do
the same thing  via market sur veys and esta blish what the “ke y” or “benc hmark” jo bs are wor th in the marke t.
Perhaps the best way to think of what you get fro m such a surv ey is to conside r the report o f Figure V.  H ere is
duplicated, in stylized form, the type of data reported in wage and salary surveys.22  It should be evident from Figure
V that there is no single market wage but an array of rates as different employers pay what they do based on
considerations including ab ility to pay, relative po sition in labor and product markets, organization expansion or
contraction, demands of unions, governmental regulatory requirements, and the other myriad components to the pay
policies they fo llow.  
Statisticians examine F igure V an d find there is  a wealth of reportable statistics therein.23  More importantly, and
adding to the levels  of complication, the statistics can be reported in two entirely different ways: based on numbers of
organizations reporting and based on the number of employees those enterprises report.  In fact, the complications are
so many in number that a t least one study has investigated how analysts process such data to obtain estimates of the
market for use; Belcher, Ferris and O’Neill (1985) report, based on a sample of 34 firms, that employers use over 95
different computational strategies to manipulate such data.24
For our purp oses, howe ver, suffice it to  say that the objective is to obtain an “estimate” of the market wage (or
wages): that it can be done regardless of the specific form of job evaluation used and it leads to the quantification of
external equity.  By whatever process utilized, compensation analysts develop estimates of the “market” wage/salary for
each job and use that information to specify where the organization will be relative to that ma rket.  Thus, organizations


say they are 90 percent of market or 105 p ercent of ma rket, conce pts which will be come m ore app arent in the section
which follows.25
Bringing the Internal and External Together
The ultimate objective of the compensation effort is to bring the measures of internal and external equities together
and set the stage for determining the pay of individual workers.  That process can be as simple as arraying pay in the
hierarchy of the ranking system to as complica ted as app lying sophisticate d regressio n technique s.  We  will lean toward
the latter as it provides the broadest insight into how the systems typically work.26
One of the most significant contributions to the growth of scientific approaches to the American compensation
world  was the expansion of the use of computers and their ability to perform regression analysis.  This moved
compensation practices from the level of “guesstimation” to “precision” in that it allowed powerful statistics to be applied
to the data.27  It is this quantitative approach, moreover, which allows for a full explication of the principles of individual
wage and salary setting.
As was indicated above, the first task using regression analysis is to calculate the organization line of least squares
combining the job po ints from the evaluation system which you have calculated for each job and use them as the
independent variable against which current salary for that job is regressed.28  Here, again, there may be variations in
approach as some use the individual job’s mean, some use the median, some use all rates being paid the job.  Such a pay
line has been illustrated in Figure I above.
The second task is to use only the key jobs and calculate the market line of least squares.  This is done using the
“market rate” of pay (as was  discussed a bove) ca lculated from  the wage and  salary surveys  together with the  job poin ts
determined for the key jobs.29  This produces what is called a market pay line, in a sense exhibiting the re lative worth
of the key jobs to the organization from the horizontal axis of Figure I above, and the “average” market worth of the jobs
on the vertical axis.  The combined result is presented in Figure VI, with the individual “M”s of the key jobs added.
What is also inherent Figure VI is the comparison between the organization and the market pay lines.  As
represented here, the organization is paying above the market for the lower paying jobs and below the market for higher
paying ones.30   T his is a practice engaged in by those firms which believe in the inertia of workers and feel that once
you attract them  (by paying we ll) you can kee p them eve n if you fall behind  the market.
But perh aps of equ al interest is the fact that a  diagram like  Figure VI  can be use d to represent two other aspects
of compen sation mana gement and  the equity therein .  First, it must be noted that while the organization pay line moves
once or twice a year as a pay plan is set forth, the market pay line is constantly moving as the universe of organizations
which make up the market cha nge their  pay levels at varying times.  This means that the organization is always dealing
with a moving target when setting pay rates and the actual level of external “equity” is constantly changing.
The second aspect of the diagram is that it characterizes the relationship organizations are talking about when they
position them selves relative to  the market.   When firms claim to be “90 percent of the market” or “105 percent of the
market,”  they are speaking of where their organization line is relative to the market line as a matter of policy choice.
As is implicitly noted above, some firms lag the market and some lead the market as a  practice; some do so with a portion
of their jobs an d some d o it with all of them.  It should also be obvious that any such statement is correct only at one
point during the year; as  the market m oves in its inexo rable way up ward the rela tionship betw een firm and  market is
constantly  changing.  T his difference in  movement between the organization and the market leads to policies like lead-
lag, lag-lag, and a variety of similar designations, measures of relative equity and time.
Obviously, what this also means is that the relationship of Figure VI  is only one of se veral ways in wh ich pay in
the organization and pay in the market may be related  and the effect of the two may be exp erienced.  Each of these
alternatives represents a policy alternative for the organization with associated up side benefits and downsid e risks.  Here
again the organization is deciding, in a slightly different way, what it is paying for (typically in terms of areas like
turnover and employee satisfaction).
In Figure VII the organization has done what has been discussed above: it has specified one aspect of its pay plan
for the coming year.  Here, the organization has a cted through offering constant do llar increases over existing rates,
causing the organization pay line to shift directly  upward.  Had the organization given equal percentage changes, the
organization line would have twisted upward and to the left as jobs at the upper end of the distribution received larger
dollar amounts in their adjustments than those on the lower end.



The analysis of Figure VII is carried still further in Figure VIII, where job grades and pay ranges are added to the
future (i.e., propo sed) orga nization pay lin e and the m arket pay line.  Job grades represent an effort to ease administrative
burden.  Rather than looking at each job as an entity, jobs with relatively common characteristics, typically as measured
by their job points, are grouped together as a grade (along the horizontal axis) and treated identically (again reflecting
the idea of equity).31
 
The pay range is measured on the vertical scale as it reflects the various rates of pay which may be attached to the
jobs within the pay grade(s) and reflect what the incumbent brings to them.  It is here that the American compensation
practitioner moves away from job standards and classifications to individual/personal ones.   What occurs here is oriented
toward rewarding the worker’s contributions to the enterprise.32
Genera lly, pay ranges a re specified in  terms of their  maximum, minimum and midpoint; with the latter located on
the organization’s pay line, something done to Grade C of Figure VIII.33  These concepts are  measures of where, under
routine circumstanc es, an individu al’s pay may b e set.  Obvio usly, most workers will be above the minimum which
represents the lowest rate paid those in the grade.34  The midpoint usually represents the middle of the pay range and
is akin to the median and stands as a measure of central tendency.  The maximum is the highest rate p aid any wor ker in
a grade, typically representing the highest levels of individual accomplishment in a job.35
From the perspective of pay and individual equity, it is the pay ranges which are intended to ensure employees are
rewarded accordin g to their  particular co ntributions to  the organiza tion.  Mo vement up  and throug h a pay rang e typically
is based on two considerations:  seniority and on- the-job performa nce.  W hile the specific  patterns of m ovemen t will
vary among o rganizations , typically they are something like seniority below the midpoint and performance above the
midpoint or seniority the first third of the range, seniority and performance the second third, and strictly performance
the top third.  What is happening here is the organization is deciding what in an individual’s personal job performance
characteristics to reward in order to recognize his/her contributions.  Obviously, different organizations will make
different polic y choices with re gard to wha t they recogniz e as being im portant.                                                             
                              
Job Ev aluation  Systems O nce Ag ain
Earlier we asked what differences did individual job evaluation systems make in terms of the relative worth of jobs
in an organization and concluded they could be substantial.  We now ask essentially the same question but focus on what
happens to individual pay rates....the amounts a worker actually received after external equity is considered.  The answer
is given in Table VI which  looks at dollars.
What Table VI reports is the actual wages or salaries proposed by the teams described earlier once they had
accounted for the labor market (i.e., what others were paying) and the ability to pay of our organization...the external
equity issues...given their  different job evaluation systems.  What may appear as surprising about Table VI is how similar
the results are acro ss the different system s.  The certa inly are far different fro m the relative w orth of jobs established by
these systems and reported in Table V.
Note—they did not co me up with  exactly the same rate for each job but it is surprising how close they are....and
in a few cases they were identical.  Since the actual pay rates proposed also reflect differences in pay policies the
individual teams established and other structural differences identified by each of the teams, variations would be
expected.  But the mes sage from T ables V a nd VI is  that, given rational approaches to the implementation of individual
job evaluation systems, it is difficult to go very far astray as the economic forces acting on the enterprise and the external
labor ma rket in which it op erates keep  it from paying w ay beyond  its competito rs. 
CURRENT TRENDS AND ISSUES: ARE WE RETURNING TO THOSE DAYS OF YESTERYEAR?
Enterprises in United States are focusing on two “new” major forms of pay setting: Skill or Competency Based
Pay and Broad Banding.36  These changes arise out of concerns over the productivity of individual workers and a desire
to for the organization to be m ore productive as the forc es of competition worldw ide push for efficiencies.


Skill and competency based pay are similar in that they are directed at paying people for individual rather than job
characteristics.  The idea is that workers will be paid based on the number and breadth of the skills they bring to or
acquire on the job. Skills are the abilities and knowledge a person possesses which are directly relevant to the
job/position occupied. Competencies are the broad -based und erstanding o f and ability  to apply co nceptual p ractices to
the operation of the enterprise.37
Obviou sly, skills are genera lly applicable to production and service worker jobs while competencies are
characteristic  of managerial jobs.   In each of these system approaches, the ideas are not radically different from what has
been raised above—the differences are in the mechanics of application.
Broad Banding involves taking the grades and ranges of Figure VIII and expanding them in size and reducing them
in number as is done in Figure IX (to only one in the limit).  Thus, the num ber of grades combined can range from four
or five to as many as the enterprise  operates (Abo sch, Gilbert, and Dem psey, 1994).  De  facto the controls which exist
in pay grades and ranges are cast aside and ostensibly there is wide latitude given as to where individual wage rates are
set.  However, control is maintained by putting zones, control points, breaks, or other measures in  the system to provide
guidance as to what is to be paid for particular jobs (Milkovich and Newman,  1999).  In application, this begins to look
like traditional ranges and grad es.  In fact, Milkovic h and Ne wman (19 99, pp. 2 53-244 ) go so far as to  point this out in
their discussion.
 What is  interesting abo ut these “new”  systems of pay p hilosophy is tha t they are very simila r to the way in  which
American employers paid before the job evaluation “revolution” of the World War II era and thereafter.  Each of these
approaches looks toward paying individuals for what they are and not for the job they hold (in large part).  This does cast
doubt on some of the traditional ideas of equity and signals a movement away from  the measurable in many case s.  Only
time will tell if these movements endure.
The Legal Side - Anothe r Attempt at Ensuring Equ ity
One of the myriad of human resource functions which has seen extensive legislation has been compensation.
Beginning with minimum wage legislation in the 1930’s, and continuing through wage/pay stabilization laws during
World  War II and Korea, America m oved to e quitable pa y legislation in  the 1960’s and 1970’s.  Again, the theme was
to tie pay more  closely to wha t the individual d id in/for the enterprise, less to personal characteristics.  These  efforts came
in three/four guises.
The Equal Pay Act of 1963
The movement for civil/equal rights in America led to passage of the Equal Pay Act of 196338 which was intended
to ensure women and men doing the same job were paid the same wage or salary.  The language of the Act focused on
the basic components of job evaluation systems discussed above:
No employer shall discriminate between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to emp loyees less
than the rate at which  he pays wag es to emplo yees of the op posite  sex for equal work on jobs which require
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and similar working cond itions.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress  passed general anti-discrimination legislation a year later, encompassing a variety of provisions in the
Civil Rights Act o f 1964.  T he legislation atta cked discr imination in a va riety of forms from public accommodations
through education to employment.  With respect to pay, Title VII (the employment section of the legislation) said:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation,...(42 USC 2000 e-2, [703] Sec (a) (1)).
The intent of this language was to ensure that employers p aid individuals equally regardless  of their racial or ethnic
background.  This was to sto p arrange ments where employers, trade unions, and others allowed workers to be paid based
on personal fac tors other than  those which w ere job re lated.39  T here was no  explicit mentio n of the four basic
compe nsable  factors—skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions—in the statute but the standards were
implicitly present.40
Pay Equity/Com parable Worth  Legislation of the 1970’s
Equitable  pay betwee n women  and men, a n expected  outcome  of the Equa l Pay Act, nev er materialize d as clearly
as had been anticipated.  The earnings of women persisted at sixty percent of those of men and the belief was that more
needed to be don e.41  A va riety of states and  their political subdivision s chose to en act and imp lement “com parable
worth” legislation in the 1970s and 1980s.  Unlike “equal pay for equal work” (the objective of the 1963 Act),
compa rable worth sought “equal pay for work of equal value.”  In most cases, the search for an answer came through
the use of job evaluation and  compensation systems.
What this meant was that jobs with the same “job points” from a job evaluation system would be paid the same
pay rate regard less of the gend er of the incum bent.  The premise was that employers took advantage of discrimination
against women in the labor market and paid them lower wages/salaries than men when  they were in jo bs of com parable
or equal worth, contributing to the persistent earnings gap.  It is worth noting that while the gap has been eroding (see
pp. 3-4, above), to the authors’ knowledge no one has gone back and looked at the effects of the compar able worth e fforts
which were initiated.
Executive Compensation.....Equity Gone A muck?
Earlier, we introduced this American perspective on executive compensation by pointing out the objections of the
AFL-CIO and others to what have been termed “obscene” levels of pay for American  senior exec utives.  It needs to be
noted that these pay levels are the result of varied  and com plex types o f reward me chanisms.  T hus, we could  note that
most American executives typically have five components to their compensation package, each playing a role in the sum
total:42
A. Salary  - Most  executives realize a salary which is actually relatively small given the large amount of
attention paid to exe cutive “exces s.”  If fact, many executives’ salaries could be described as close to or consistent with
the results from the basic job evaluation system  used to determine the wag es and salaries of all other employee s.
B. Short - Nearly every executive participates in a short term
Term bonus program which ties pay to gains made in a
Bonus short time frame—typically a year.
C.  Long - These are bonuses typically tied to a goal which
Term take some period of time to accomplish—such as
(Performance) bringing a new product to market, achieving a targe-
Bonus ed return on equity, attaining a specified rate of sales growth, or completing a desired acquisition.
D. Incentive - ISOs are options for an executive to purchase 
Stock shares of the company’s stock at the stock’s fair 
Options market value on the d ate of the gran t for a period  of up to  ten years.  As there is a $100,000 per
year vesting limitation on these programs, these do not hold out the promise of large rewards.  The objective is for the
executive to work to raise the company’s stock price so that he or she and the  stockhold ers will share in the w ealth
gained.
E. Nonqualified - These a re the prog rams which typ ically generate
Stock the large, newsworthy, compe nsation levels.
Options  An executive is granted the right to purchase shares of the company at a stated “option price” for
a defined period of time—usually 10 years—where the option price is the fair market value of the stock on the option’s
issue date.  Here again, the ob jective is for the exe cutive to wor k in his/her interest a nd that of the sto ck holders  to
improve  share price a nd genera te more we alth for all.
It is the size of the sum total of all of these payment types—but particularly the Nonqualified Stock
Options—which have led A merican ex ecutives to ea rn so much  more than th ose who to il at lower levels in their
organizatio ns.  The ratio of CEO pay to production worker pay in the US (based on Business Week data) has moved
inexorab ly higher and no end of the trend is in sight (see “Executive Pay: Up Up and Away,” Business  Week, April 19,
1999, pp. 72-1 18).   And  there are signs th e problem  may be spr eading: Business  Week reported that the German
executives at Daimler-B enz were q uite attracted to  the pay levels o f their Chrysler co unterparts an d sought to r eplicate
them in their own com pensation p ackages (“S pecial Rep ort: Eager E uropean s Press T heir Nose s to the Glass, Business
Week, April 19, 1999, p. 89).  Indeed, some European managers were reported to be asking that payments to them be
made in America so that their domestic shareholders, workers, and unions would not find out where their pay was
trending according to reports in Forbes, The Wall Street Journal, and The Econom ist during the Spring of 1999 and
2000. 
Complicating matters is the fact these executives can gain when their “contributions” might even be viewed as
negative.  The American “Bull Market” of the late 1990s led to substantial increases in the prices of stocks when the
companies involved actually performed quite poo rly....and their  executives were rewarde d handsomely in turn.43   These
differences between perform ance and pay have  led to statements like the following in the business press:
“Executive Pay: S tock optio ns plus a bull m arket mad e a mocke ry of many attem pts to link pay to
performance.” 
                            Business Week, April 20, 1998 
“Did They Earn It? Sometimes there’s no connection between pay and performance.” 
                            Forbes, May 18, 1998
Indeed, Business Week published the report “Who Earned Their Keep—And Who Didn’t” on Page 103 of the April 17,
2000, e dition indica ting how ma ny top exec utives had failed  to produ ce results com mensurate w ith their pay.
From an internation al perspec tive, the Amer ican execu tive does ve ry well when co mpared  to executiv es from
around the world.  Based on Business Week data, the total compensation of American CEO’s exceeds by a factor of two
that of executives in other parts of the industrialized  world whe n purchasin g power is  compared.  That is, US executives
can generally buy twice as much with what they get paid as can their counterparts elsewhere.  This leads to questions
about whether they actually are worth twice as much, something about which there is debate in the American business
press and elsewhere.
It is the apparent no end in sight for this upward relative and absolute movement of executives compensation that
has people worried a nd raised provo cative questions.  Is it fair for these to get so much when those below them often get
so little?  Is there really such a shortage of executive talent?  Does the  effort really  match the reward?  ...and this list
could be extende d....without satisfactory and conclusive answers.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The intention of this discussion has been to draw a picture of American compensation systems and practices in light
of concerns for equitable treatment of workers.  P ay in this context is seen as being aligned with what the worker does/the
contribution made to  the organization as well as with what is paid for similar contribution s in the larger lab or marke t.
The variety of job evaluation and pay determination systems are intended to balance these concerns by acknowledging
internal and e xternal equity a nd seeking to  obtain a resu lt which recog nizes both.  
Given the task of attaining these dual and often somewhat conflicting objectives, systems range from the simple
to the profound reflecting organizational size realities, job complexities, managerial and worker expectations, and a host
of other factors.  Moreover, systems have tended to proliferate in the American setting as organizations have modified
existing programs and attempted to make them more closely fit their needs.  Any program one examines is virtually
certain to have at least o ne (if not several)  near “fraternal” twin as they are massaged to fit the circumstances of different
employers.  It seems everyone wants a system to work “a little bit better” for them.
Even given all of these efforts, the systems and their operations are no t perfect.  Jobs, and the work environment
in which they take  place, are both complic ated and d ynamic and  any job eva luation system is un likely to be ab le to
measure all that is involved.  This means that systems are always evolving to keep up with the times.  It also means that
systems developed m any years ago still deliver good results becau se they have been modified over the years to keep them
up to date.
Obviou sly some questions have been raised about these practices in light of differences in racial, gender, and
executive p ay levels in the U.S.  Inde ed, the princ iples of equity ap plied regula rly have fallen sho rt when the intere sts
and needs of particular groups have been examined.  People have often pointe d out that the A merican system s tend to
measure more of what is in men’s jobs— working conditions,  strength, gross skills— and less of wh at is in women ’s
jobs—caring, attention to de tail, gentleness.  Ind eed, this is  true and is something which doubtless needs to be explored
and corrected as we move deeper into the Twenty-First Century and the labor force becomes even more female.
And the pay of many of the CEOs and other executives in America seems to bear little relationship to what they
do.  Studies in the academic press and the general media do not support the conclusion that such large paym ents yield
better organizatio nal perform ance.  And wha t is more troub ling is the apparent trend around the world to move toward
the American mod el rather seeing the U.S. move  toward the pay practices o f its international counterparts.
The astute reader will perceive that the American system of compensation management can be described as
involving the mix of art and science in ma ny respects.  T he applica tion of job e valuation system s to measure  the specific
content/value of jobs requires judgement and subjectivity above what some might desire to employ; engendering
resistance in those newly involved in the process.   The assessment of market wages is another of those “arts” which
requires judgement and insight that challenge—and worry—the neophyte.  We then attach to these processes some of
the most powerful tools of statistical analysis in order to obtain the e stimates we wa nt and need  to complete  our ultimate
task: assigning pay rates to individual workers.
Implicit  in all of this is that whatever the employer does in the pay arena constitutes a policy choice where
something stands to be gained and something may be lost.  After all, an employer could decide “We will never raise pay
again!”  Such a policy would do wonders for labor co sts into the (short run) future – but it also would mean that the
organization would no longer be able to attract labor.  While extreme, this position is one of many which the American
compensation manager c an take in de aling with the pay of workers, in a sense  one anchor point over a long continuum
of possible  choices.  
ENDNOTES
* The authors would like to acknowledge the support of those who assisted us in the development of this chapter. The list is too long to
include all but special thanks go to Jim Bowers and Vicky Wright of the Hay group for their provision of documentation and supporting materials
and to Rod Kelsey of Riley, Dettman, and Kelsey for additional inputs. More importantly, we are grateful to the many legislators and hundreds of
curious students who, over the years, have forced us to continually rethink where compensation p ractices in the United St ates are go ing . . . and why!
1. The discussion presented below represents analysis and synthesis from many who have trodden these waters before. Included are Beach
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3. Also note that in  many cases of government sector utilization, the determination of wages and salaries is a political rather than an economic
matter – often wages are determined  by the legislative b ranch and n ot by the market or  anything else!
4. In reality this is one of the major issues with job evaluation, trying to obtain truly independent compensable factors in order to be able
to measure what distinguishes one job from another.
5. For example, the pay rate for the Engineer would involve totalling $7.98 for Mental Requirements, $3.95 for Physical Requirements, $7.37
for Skill Requirements, $8 .05 for Responsibility,  and $5.32 for Working Condition s to yield an hourly rate of $33.67. This would be the base rate
and would not include payments for seniority, merit, or any other individual based criteria.
6. Actually,  there are always implicit weights in such systems. The issue is whether it is appropriate and necessary to  go further and a dd other
weighting schem es to achieve some desired outcome.
7. Thus, even if only 10 percent of a company is affected by working conditions, it may be necessary to include them to make a pay program
acceptable.
8. Systems may obtain  the same result by ca lling all t hat we are calling subfactors, factors. What this means, of course, is that these have
more factors tha n we have proposed h ere.
9. Note that, for examp le, the number  of points for education has no relationship to th e educational background of those holdin g the job or
of applicants for the job; it is solely a measure of what is required for the job.
10. These weights are based on an a priori belief as to what importance is to be attached to each of the compensable factors. As is evident
from Table IV, to be discussed below, there is no absolutely correct choice here – only a policy decision.
11. Richard Henderson (1989) reports that point factor systems make up approximately 20 percent of job evaluation systems.
12. Note that these subjects will be treated only briefly here. A more complete presentation follows in the section on bringing the internal and
external markets together.
13. One of the difficulties in American compensation practice is the variety of names given to common quant itative and  statistica l measures
over the years. Unfortu nately, most of these still remain in  the jargon and  the reader is advised to be vigilant when reading American  compensation
literature to be certain what the author(s) intend.
14. Copyright © The Hay Group
15. See, for example, Eugene J. Bemge, Samuel L.H. Burke, and Edward N. Hay, Manual of Job Evaluation (New York, NY: Harper and
Brothers, 1941), and Edward  N. Hay and Dale Purves, “A New Method of Job Evaluation,” Personnel, Vol. 31, No. 7 (July  1954), pp. 73-80.
16. This discussion is drawn from Hay company documentation. Note that there are occasions where Hay will include working conditions
in their methodology as was done in Comparable Worth practices in Minnesota (Azevedo and Roth, 1990). However, even when this is done the
measure does not figure promi nently in  the outcome of the p rocess. See also the d iscussi on of ACEs wh ich follows  below.
17. Copyright © The Hay Group
18. Copyright © The Hay Group
19. Additional Compensable Elements include but  are not limited to  Sensory Attention, Hazards, Environment, and Working Conditions,
reflecting the ability to adjust to the needs of individual employers.
20. Typically,  these systems also call for much more involvement of the job incumbents in inputting data to the process and working with
the results when they are developed because they are the ones most intimately aware of what the job “does”.
21. These results were obtained by teams from a graduate class in compensation administration at the University of Minnesota using the
systems identified on a common set of jobs in a parti cular organization. In each case, the teams evaluated the jobs a nd arrived at the total points
reported here. Some of the team members were neophytes at compensation; others had considerable job-related experience  in the field.
22. Variety in form of data reporting is the order of the day in wage and salary surveys. The example here is but one way in which the data
are presented. The reader is advised to proceed with caution  when peru sing any such survey and study the definitions utilized carefully. It is
unfortunate but different reports will have different names for the same measure and the same names for different measures.
23. We choose not to get involved in the phethora of statistics reported for such  documents. The reader is referred to any standard
compensation text for lengthy treatment of the statistical complications to reported data.
24. In fact, the research on data has led some to raise serious concerns ab out the market wage. See, for example, Rynes, Sara L., and George
T. Milkovich,  “Wage Surveys: Dispelling Some Myths About the “Market” Wage.” Personnel Psychology, Vol. 39, No. 1  (Spring 986), pp. 71-90.
25. Implicit here is the idea that the market provides an econ omic framework in which the firm operates, an idea with which  most if not all
can agree. In a major sense,  the economics of the setting establish the limits within which the organization places itself. The real issue is the extent
to which that framework corresponds to the world of the economist and that is open to serious question.
26. Each of the job evaluat ion systems descri bed above is implemented in a way consistent with what follows.  Rather than explicating each,
it is believed more useful to give a full explanation of the possibilities through a single method and letting the reader decide how to apply the ideas
individually.
27. There is room for debate about the use of the word precision here. Some ask whether, given the imprecision of what has gone before, it
is appropriate to call the process “exact” or “precise”. We will not resolve that debate but rather leave it  up to the readers to j udge for themselves
as to its  validity.
28. This line is also called the trend line, the pay line, the least squares line, the pay policy line, and a host of other names in American
compensation literature. Such names come from various uses to which the line has  been put  and/or t he earlier t imes when i t was simp ly drawn
freehand across an array of wage data and job points.
29. Now it may be better understood why one takes the array of data from wage and salary surveys and attempts to calculate the “market
wage”. None of the available statistical tools allows the use of anything but a point estimate of the market, mean ing that the dispersion of rates actua lly
has no specific quantitative effect on the rate determined/obtained.
30. This may be the result of a specific ‘pay policy’ or simply the results of whatever pay prac tices our organizati on is following. Wha tever
is the case, any such relationship will have both positive and negative aspects and  part of what compensation practices are  about is bala ncing these.
Obviously, there a re a variety of such p ay practices rela tive to the market line.
31. The pay grades shown are typical of most illu strations: th ey are of the same size. This is not necessary as the size of any such pay grade
should be what i s appropriat e for administ rative convenience.
32. Here again we note pa y ranges do not have to all be of the same s ize.
33. Some place the pay range with the minimum on the pay line while others choose some other metric of the pay range as their locator. When
broadbanding and similar practices are used (see below), the locus of the pay range varies over the distribution of jobs and job classes.
34. Occasionally there are rates below the range usually caused when new jobs or job evaluation systems are defined/u tilized. These are called
“Green Circle Rates” and typically are raised to the minimum of the range when identified.
35. There are three types of pay rate when may exist above an established pay range. A “Red Circle Rate” is a rate typically identified as
excessive when a job evaluation is done and is then left in place due to the social stigma against cutting wages. A “Gold Circle Rate” is a rate paid
for exemplary performance. A “Silver Circle Rate” is paid to workers who have superseniority; given to workers who have extremely long periods
of service and con stitutes a reward for that servic e.
36. Some may include Team Based Pay as a third component of this group. We would argue that it is encompassed by what is being said about
skill and competency based pay in what follows.
37. As can be detected, competencies are a good bit more general and less specific than are skills. In a sense, they incorporate a range/variety
of performance which is more subjective and difficu lt to identify concretely. Examples  include expertise in areas like communication, product
awareness, system building, an d industry/m arket knowledge.
38. The Equal Pay Act was an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act which controls minimum wages and maximum working hours.
39. The Civil Right s Act did make p rovision for pay di fferences when they were based on bona fide merit or seniority system or incentive
system which measured quantity or quality of output. See Sec. 20 00e – 2 (2) (h).
40. The U.S. Supreme Court intimated as much i n its decision in County of Washington v. Alberta Gunt her et al., 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
41. Note that this gap is an earnings differential and not a pay differential. This measured phenomenon speaks to more going on in the
American labor market than just paying differently for men and women. See Gunderson (1989) for a full discussion of these issues.
42. Admitted ly, there are many more possible components to an executive’s compensation  than are disc ussed here. Other examples include
but are not lim ited to Phantom Stock Plans, Performance Shares, Stock Appreciation Rights, Performance Units, and Deferred Stock Units. Thus,
this survey is in tended to be illu minative rather than exhau stive.
43. See the special report, Executive Pay, published by the Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2000, for  a full explication of the trend developments
in executive compensation. Even this very business-oriented p ublication raises concerns about t he trends in what executives are receiving.
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